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Abstract 
The paper introduces a conceptual framework that could improve the safety performance 
measurement process and ultimately the aviation system safety performance. The framework 
provides an implementation guide on how organisations could design and develop a proactive, 
measurement tool for assessing and measuring the Acceptable Level of Safety Performance 
(ALoSP) at sigma (σ) level, a statistical measurement unit. In fact, the methodology adapts 
and combines quality management tools, a leading indicators programme and Lean-Six 
Sigma methodology to formally measure and continuously improve a stable and in-control 
safety management process by reducing safety defects and variability from core 
organisational processes and objectives. The implementation guide was empirically tested 
and validated with data collected and analysed within a period of nine (9) months by the 
safety department of a complex aviation organisation operating a large transport aircraft fleet.  
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1. Introduction   
According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 19 (2013), ‘safety 
is the state in which risks associated with aviation activities are reduced and controlled to an 
acceptable level’. Indeed, safety is a system quality stemming from a legal and regulatory 
framework that stipulates strict and high performance targets as well as a number of activities 
that must be performed by air operators. According to ICAO Annex 19 each service provider 
shall, as a minimum:  Provide continuing monitoring and regular assessment of safety performance   Ensure remedial action to maintain agreed performance.  Aim at a continuous performance improvement  
At European level, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA, 2014), in parallel to 
management system requirements, outlined its new harmonised approach for establishing a 
Performance-Based Environment by introducing a clear set of indicators and targets against 
which the oversight performance of civil aviation authorities is assessed.  However, ICAO and 
EASA do not provide a clear guidance on how stakeholders could proactively measure safety 
performance. Besides, in aviation industry there is a level of uncertainty as to what extent 
existing methodologies for measuring performance are suitable for those operators who have 
already achieved excellent safety records and in-control processes and as such look for further 
improvements. 
 
1.1. Key Research Questions 
 
Safety performance is the State’s or the service provider’s safety achievement as defined by its 
Safety Performance Indicators and Safety Performance Targets (ICAO, 2013). Consequently, 
this study explores and further investigates the following key research questions: 
 
(1) What methodology could proactively measure system safety performance and improve 
the safety performance measurement process? 
(2) Could a conceptual framework assist the continuous improvement of the safety 
performance measuring process?  
 
1.1.  Aim  
 
For addressing the key research questions, the paper aims to present a conceptual framework 
that will improve the safety performance measurement process and the aviation system safety 
performance. Fig. 1 presents the framework, where the Safety-Performance Indicator Lean 
Sigma (Safety-PILS) model has been embedded within Define –Measure- Analyse-Improve 
and Control (DMAIC) continuous improvement process.  
This integration results in a continuous improvement framework that measures system safety 
performance and reduces the safety process variability. In addition, the study provides an 
implementation guide on how air operators could use this framework to design and develop a 
proactive, performance-based methodology for measuring Acceptable Levels of Safety 
Performance (ALoSP) at sigma (σ) level, a statistical measurement unit. 
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Figure 1. The researcher’s conceptual framework 
 
2. Measuring Safety Performance  
An effective performance measurement system should monitor past performance and help to 
plan desired future performance (Gutierrez et al., 2014). According to Muller (2014), one of 
the main Safety Management System (SMS) objectives is to measure system effectiveness, 
improving safety performance and therefore reducing exposure to the risk of having an 
accident or serious incident. Since most accidents have multiple precursors and cues that an 
accident is likely to happen, there is a common belief that even a small number of general 
‘leading indicators’ can identify increased risk of an imminent accident (Leveson, 2015). 
Besides, Leveson (2015) discusses how to operationalise leading indicators as shaping and 
warning signals and through the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model (STAMP) proposes 
assumptions and their vulnerabilities as a proactive methodology for identifying leading 
indicators in an aviation system.  
Furthermore, Podgorski (2015) suggests that new approaches and methods are needed to 
ensure management system effectiveness and he proposes a method for ranking and 
prioritising proactive safety performance indicators related to occupational health and safety 
based on the utilisation of a certain set of Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and 
Timely (SMART) criteria. In addition, Andriulo (2014) proposes a lean safety framework for 
measuring the effectiveness of a near-miss management system in the automotive industry. 
Also, Ulfvengren (2014) argues that Lean methodology by integrating quality management 
with existing management processes would achieve operational effectiveness and could 
demonstrate safety performance in compliance with new aviation safety regulations. Besides, 
Verstneten et al (2014) introduced a framework of SPIs for the aviation industry and 
concluded that unless a process for continuous safety monitoring is in place, the system of 
SPIs only provides a snapshot view of safety.  
In the aviation industry, EASA has recently established the Network of Analysts (NoA) SPI 
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Sub Group for considering the subject of SPIs (EASp, 2014). Moreover, a Safety 
Management International Collaboration Group (SM-ICG) was created in February 2009 as a 
joint activity between key aviation authorities to encourage progress and harmonisation.  
Although various guidelines have been developed, measuring performance from SPIs will 
require some time for air operators to determine how SPIs represent safety performance 
(Roelen, 2012). Also, Karanikas (2016) argues that aviation authorities have not clearly 
defined the different meanings between ‘system effectiveness’ and ‘effective operation of a 
system’:the former regards the effects of the system on the organisation whereas the latter 
refers to how much satisfactory a system is operated.  
To sum up, in aviation industry the measurement process of a set of pre-defined indicators for 
measuring system’s safety performance has not yet been introduced or standarised. In 
addition, the development and measurement of proper SPIs is not straightforward and the 
operational experience for measuring the effectiveness of SMS is very limited, since ‘there 
are many questions yet to be answered on measuring safety performance’ (Roelen, 2012).   
Consequently, the main challenge remains how to control and maintain performance within 
agreed safety specification limits and how to develop an objective methodology that will 
proactively investigate and measure system performance variability (±σ) from target.    
3. Lean Six-Sigma for measuring safety performance 
Lean-Six Sigma (L6S) has been applied in the manufacturing and healthcare industry since 
1990 (Mason, 2015) and is considered as the integration of two management philosophies, 
Lean and Six Sigma, and has been seen as a robust improvement methodology (Tenera, 2014).  
According to Harmon (2014), Lean focuses on improving the flow of activities and 
Six-Sigma focuses on improving the quality and consistency of process outputs. Ulfvengren 
(2014) in an effort to develop a Safe-Lean concept for an airline that integrates Lean with 
SMS structures and processes and demonstrates safety performance concluded that, ‘what 
can be really monitored is the normal variation of performance data .’ Nevertheless, this 
research study argues that Lean itself cannot bring any safety measurement process under 
statistical control.  
Therefore, many organisations, such as Motorola, Samsung, Sony and Honeywell are using 
six-sigma (6σ) for enhancing safety and as a continuous improvement management tool 
(Rehman, 2012). Six-Sigma is a statistical measure of excellence in process performance 
wherein process tolerance corresponds to 6σ with a maximum of 3.4 Defects Per Million 
Opportunities (DPMO). Consequently, a process performing at 7σ corresponds to 0.019 
DPMO, an outcome that may satisfy most aviation safety departments. Besides, Harmon 
(2014) argues that six-sigma is a good methodology for understanding the measuring process 
and the use of statistical techniques to analyse the outcomes.  
4. The Conceptual framework  
The conceptual framework for measuring safety performance composed of the Safety-PILS 
model embedded within the DMAIC continuous improvement process. The next sections of 
this chapter are presenting this combined effort along with a practical implementation step 
guide for measuring system safety performance. 
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4.1 The Safety –PILS model 
The Safety-PILS model provides guidance on how organisations could design, implement and 
use a proactive, performance-based measurement tool for assessing and measuring ALoSP. For 
the purposes of this study, safety performance is measured at sigma (σ) level.  
 
.  
Figure 2. Illustration of the Safety-PILS model, inspired from Ishikawa (1968)  
 
Nevertheless, the Safety-PILS model shown in Fig. 2 provides a holistic view on how 
organisations could set leading performance indicators and monitor metrics1 on the top of 
identified root-causes that affect safety performance or how to set lagging indicators and 
feedback metrics on the top of safety outcomes (occurrences - effects). In fact, the above model 
adapts and combines quality management tools, a leading indicators programme and L6S 
methodology to continuously improve a stable and in-control safety management process. In 
particular, an Ishikawa-fishbone (Ishikawa, 1968) root-cause and effect diagram is used for 
establishing leading and lagging performance indicators in an aviation system aiming at within 
±1.5 sigma (σ) tolerable safety limits.  
 
Figure 3. The safety management system performance 
                                                        
1
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development define metric ‘as a system 
of measurement used to quantify SPIs or how the SPI is being measured’(OECD,2008)   
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Nevertheless, the Safety-PILS model aims to control and maintain safety performance within 
agreed Upper or Lower Specification Limits (i.e. USL, LSL) and to develop an objective 
methodology that will proactively investigate and measure system performance variability 
within ±1.5 sigma (σ) from an ALoSP target. In addition, Fig. 3 shows how the overall 
performance of an integrated safety management system implemented within an aviation 
organisation could be affected by its components. The intricate relationship during operation of 
all these components eventually results in the overall safety performance for the organisation’s 
management system, usually captured by indicators relating to safety occurrences. In fact, the 
core advantage of the Safety-PILS model is that applies the Central Limit Theorem; since it 
repeatable uses a large size of data and means, the distribution of the sample means will finally 
approach a normal distribution. 
 
4.2. The DMAIC process 
 
Safety-PILS model assists operators to comprehend and design their safety system in 
accordance with the agreed safety performance targets and specification limits. Accordingly, 
the next step for the operator is to follow the DMAIC for continuously improving the overall 
system’s safety performance measurement process. Through DMAIC process, the operator 
could apply L6S methodology for measuring both the performance of each established 
indicator and system safety performance variability at sigma level from core safety objectives. 
However, the sequence of DMAIC steps and the times could vary widely, according to the size, 
the type and the complexity of the project. Since safety measurement is a ‘data-driven process’, 
operators should mainly examine whether the data are normalised, the process is in statistical 
process control and capable to achieve the desired outcome. Indeed, DMAIC is a useful 
methodology that could assist operators to accomplish this task.  
In general, the ‘Define’ phase rolls out the tools such as the Voice Of the Business (VOB) and 
project charter which identifies pre-actions in the measurement process. Also, correlation and 
multiple regression identifies the condition of optimality on root causes and effects in the 
pre-action process. The ‘Measure’ phase reveals the continuous assessment of measurement 
process, with intense brainstorming sessions on the imperative responses. In ‘Analyse’ phase, 
the vital root causes that impact the responses are identified. The ‘Improve’ phase concentrates 
on optimising the vital root causes which impact the responses by implementing potential 
solutions. In ‘Control’ phase, the confirmation run is conducted with optimality conditions and 
the results are obtained at sigma level. In addition, process variation is eliminated by framing a 
plan to control the variation within acceptable levels (Srinivasana, 2014).  
4.3. Measuring system’s safety performance: Implementation guide.  
Table 1 shows the implementation step-guide for measuring aviation system’s safety 
performance. The implementation guide is divided in two phases, Phase-I and Phase-II. 
Phase-I is mainly the utilisation of the Safety-PILS model and Phase-II the practical 
implementation of the DMAIC process. Both phases are forming the conceptual framework.  
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Table 1. Implementation step guide for measuring system’s safety performance 
 
5. Phase I: Design Safety-PILS model for VOB 
 
Key terms and concepts in Lean are the Voice of the Customer (VOC) and the Voice of the 
Business (VOB). VOC reflects the customer needs and the customer perceptions of operator’s 
products and services, whereas VOB usually refers to what an enterprise strives to achieve, 
such as key organisational targets and objectives. Since both VOC and VOB identify 
improvement opportunities and consume outputs from a process, they need to be in harmony 
(Arafeh, 2015).  
 
Figure 4. The Voice of the Business (VOB) for aviation safety 
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Fig. 4 shows how the safety department of a complex air operator utilised the Safety-PILS 
model for designing the Voice of the Business (VOB) related to flight safety. The driven 
KSPI has a clear organisational target and USL, meaning to achieve a Safety Occurrence 
rate/1000 Flying Hours (FH) of 0.6 and not exceeding the rate of 1.1 by the end of 2016. 
Moreover, all leading and lagging SPIs are normally drawn with their associated specification 
limits and a clear target. Finally, each SPI consists of a set of monitor and feedback metrics 
and, each metric should perform within specification limits for achieving its target.  
 
Figure 5. VOB: Indicative Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) & associated Metrics 
 
As an indicative example, Fig. 5 shows two indicators, the SPI_02: Runway excursions (RE) 
and SPI_06: Loss of Control (LOC) with their associated metrics. In particular, SPI_02 and 
SPI_06 with the metrics ‘Unstable-De-stabilised approaches (all)’ and ‘Take-off 
configuration warnings events’ have been selected as a research sample for further explaining 
and validating the conceptual framework implementation guide. The VOB indicators have 
been selected based on the Pareto Analysis results, past experience and literature review. Also, 
the study examined the correlation exist among VOB indicators and revealed a moderate to 
strong correlation, since all examined Pearson’s coefficient (R) values were ranging from 
0.6-0.8. Finally, the regression analysis revealed that ‘Unstable - De-stabilised approaches’ is 
the metric that accounts the most for the variation in the VOB process output. 
 
6. Phase II: Apply Six Sigma DMAIC methodology 
 
Phase II starts with the Data Collection Planning (DCP), the hypothesis testing and control 
chart selection. During DCP the Safety Office had to decide on what type of data is most 
appropriate to collect for measuring the VOB SPIs and metrics, what resolution is needed, what 
statistical tool should be used to interpret the data and what the sample size and frequency 
should be. For the purpose of this study the VOB sample size was 2.0 and the sampling 
frequency for collecting data was twice a month. The subgroup size for the VOB was identified 
as 1.0. The type of the safety data was quantitative-discrete, collected within a period of 6 
months, meaning Jan 2016 – Jun 2016, and analysed with Minitab 17 software during Jul-Sep 
2016. In addition, the hypothesis summary report of Paired t-tests, STDV and Anderson 
Darling (AD) normality tests revealed that the data initially followed the normal distribution 
curve and there was no special cause for any detected variation that needed further 
investigation (i.e. value P>0.05).  
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Next, the appropriate Statistical Process Control (SPC) Charts for understanding the 
performance of the examined indicators have been selected. Since, a single chart may not 
allows the operator to model a process in a way that gives the needed understanding, the 
safety office implemented multiple charts drawing from the same set of data. The Xbar chart 
plotted the mean and examined no special causes of variation (i.e. no points outside control 
limits), meaning that the process was ‘in control’. The Moving Range (MR) chart indicated 
that the average was moving downwards and the R chart plotted the sample range, meaning 
the extreme max-min values of each examined subgroup. Finally, the control charts and in 
particular MR charts were considered as effective since the data were normally distributed.  
During Measurement System Analysis (MSA) the Gauge R&R–Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) reports revealed that 7.32% of the total variation reported was caused by the gauge. 
Since this number was lower than 10% was considered acceptable. Also, Part-to-Part 
variation was 0.38651 which was big enough and therefore, good for the measurement 
system. The ‘Data by operator’ graphs revealed the variance recorded for each metric. 
Although some variation was still apparent, the metrics were measured consistently with each 
other. Finally, the ‘Part operator interaction’ graph revealed that the line for each metric 
followed about same pattern and the averages varied enough that differences were clear, 
which was also reasonable. To this end, it appeared that the measurement system was 
adequate for the operator’s needs.  
One of the next critical steps of Phase II was the Process Capability analysis. Process 
capability could assist the operator to understand if the measurement process of a particular 
SPI or metric is capable or efficient (i.e. the process fits within USL/LSL). Besides, to 
determine the sigma level the particular indicator performs. The analysis revealed that Cp> Cpk 
meaning that the potential process of both metrics was centered. In addition, the Cpk was less 
than 1, meaning that not only a special cause but also a common cause of variation was going to 
produce unacceptable variation (i.e. defects). Cp=0.17 means that only 17% of the process fit 
within USL/LSL and Cpk=-0.08 means the process was 80% over one specification limit. The 
control charts revealed that there was no special cause of variation, meaning that this process 
was in-control. However, neither the actual process nor the potential was capable. At this point 
the operator had to apply solutions or to take mitigation measures such as, improving oversight 
through Flight Data Monitoring (FDM), improving the Standard and Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) related to unstable approaches or take-off configuration warnings, increasing Flight 
Crew awareness and enhancing Flight Simulator training requirements.  
During study period, several intermediate process performance reports of the ‘VOB before’ 
implementing solutions took place for re-evaluating the actual and potential capability of the 
process. In one report, it appeared that the actual capability was still poor with 21.74% of the 
process being out of specification limits with 217391 DPMO. Nevertheless, the process 
remained centered since Cp>Cpk, thus, the most cost effective way to reduce variation was to 
discover and then eliminate (or reduce) any special causes might appear in the follow-up 
measurement phase. In fact, the overall actual process appeared to perform between 2-3 sigma 
level performance (i.e. including 1.5 sigma shift). In addition, by implementing the proposed 
solutions the potential of the process was to improve since only 1.34% of the process could 
probably remain outside the specification limits with an expected number of DPMO=13391. 
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Consequently, the new (i.e. potential) process could perform between 3-4 sigma level 
performance after implementing solutions, meaning that solutions could achieve 1 sigma 
process performance improvement comparing to the actual performance. Therefore, the 
operator proceeded by implementing the proposed solutions. Also, the diagnostic report of the 
‘VOB before’ implementing solutions verified that data were continuing to follow a normal 
distribution since P value=0.448. Therefore the operator could conclude that the 
abovementioned Cpk results were valid. Besides, in one case the the Xbar-R chart showed four 
special causes for the existing variation. In fact, the existence of a special cause is not necessary 
a problem since it can add to or detract from the total process variation.  
The process performance report of the VOB that was received right ‘after’ implementing 
solutions, re-evaluated the actual and potential capability of the process. It appeared that the 
actual capability was initially improving, the process was remaining centered and the data were 
continuing to follow a normal distribution. Besides, the Xbar-R chart showed none special 
causes for the existing variation.  
 
Figure 6. Summary report - capability comparison for VOB before and after. 
 
To conclude with, Fig. 6 shows the final summary report that illustrates the capability 
comparison for VOB ‘before’ and ‘after’ the implementation of solutions, as follows: 
- The percentage out of the specification limits has been significantly reduced by 51%, 
meaning from 16.43% before to 7.97%. 
- The STDV (i.e. variation) was significantly reduced by 7%.   
- The actual process performance has been increased by 0.52%  
- The sigma level has been increased by 43%,  
- The DPMO have been reduced by -84577.  
- The actual sigma performance was 1.41+1.5 sigma shift which equals to 2.91 sigma 
level performance. 
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7. Findings and Recommendations 
By the end of Sep 2016 the VOB (i.e. occurrences rate) continued to improve meaning that the 
percent defective was 0.68% and the percentage yield or acceptance rate was 99.32%. These 
results indicated that the total system’s safety effectiveness was approaching 4 sigma level 
performance with the potential to have 6210 DPMO (i.e. safety occurrences per one million 
flying hours). Nevertheless, the study had few limitations. Consequently, the paper 
recommends the application of the conceptual framework to different settings, different 
sample and type of SPIs/metrics and the qualitative validation of the results by interviewing 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). As further research the study recommends the application of 
Genetics Algorithms and Simulation to the implementation guide. In this case, a 
metaheuristic procedure could sample a set of solutions and select or generate an algorithm 
that provides a sufficiently good solution to this safety performance optimization problem. 
8. Conclusions  
In the aviation industry, the process for developing SPIs, measuring safety data and analysing 
safety performance is neither clear nor yet standarised.  The study introduced an integrated, 
empirical tested conceptual framework that may satisfy Authorities’ requirements for 
establishing a performance-based approach in aviation safety. Furthermore, the study 
identified and filled the gap existing in the literature and proposed an implementation guide 
for measuring aviation system safety performance. In particular, the paper introduced the 
Safety-PILS model that integrates with the DMAIC continuous improvement process. This 
integration develops a meaningful methodology for measuring performance, though with 
limitations. The study revealed that the application of L6S methodology can enhance the 
measuring process. To this end, the proposed guide is a new way of thinking for designing a 
safety case aims to achieve desired outcomes within agreed specifications limits. 
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